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Yemen’s Arab Spring
Outsmarting the Cunning State?
Elham Manea
Introduction
It is difficult to set a date for the start of Yemen’s Arab Spring. The conflicting recol
lections of various participants reveal a great deal about the context within which the
youth uprising took place, a context marked by tribal, regional and sectarian identities.
it is precisely this political landscape
— a Yemeni state that was created in 1990 out of
the unification of North and South Yemen — that differentiates its uprising from its
counterparts in Tunisia and Egypt.
In this chapter 1 argue that while the grievances of Yemeni youth arise from similar
roots to those of Tunisian and Egyptian youth, the context within which this revolt
took place was simply different. It was shaped by the politics of what I call the cunning
stare: a state run by ethnic core elites, who exploit the seams of international structures
and capitalize on the fear of the international community over its perceived failure to
perpetuate its grip on power.
in this chapter, 1 will first narrate several different recollections of how the Yemeni
Arab Spring began. I will then move to explain the similarities between the grievances
of youth in Yemen, on the one hand, and in Tunisia and Egypt, on the other. In the
following section 1 will highlight the differences that set Yemen apart from the other
two countries and then describe the features of the cunning Yemeni state. These fea
tures make it clear why it was not quite possible to fulfil young Yemenis’ hopes for an
end to the regime of former President Saleh.
The spark?
Ask people the starting date of Yemen’s youth revolt, and you may be surprised by how
conflicting their recollections will be.
Some, mainly youth and student activists, set the date in mid-January 2011, precisely
one day after 14 January, when Tunisian President Bin Ali fled his country. That was
the spark. they will say. Wameedh Mohammad Shakir. a leading female activist and
human rights campaigner, explained to nie that on the night when Bin Ali fled Tunisia.
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she and some colleagues organized a demonstration in front of the French Embassy in
Sana’a, the capital of Yemen: ‘We wanted to tell them, take your hands off the Arab
world’s democracy.’ It was a small demonstration, she said. ‘A day later a huge
demonstration started out of Sana’a University.’
Her account was supported by that of Tawakkol Karman, the human rights activist
and joint winner of the Nobel peace prize, in her 28 April comment for the Guardian.
She said that on 15 February a group of students from Sana’a University asked her to
attend a vigil in front of the Tunisian embassy: ‘The demonstration was astonishing;
thousands turned up, and Sana’a witnessed its first peaceful demonstration for the
overthrow of the regime!’
Others would set the date instead on 3 February, when the Joint Meeting Parties
(iMP), a coalition of six opposition parties which was part of the political establish
ment, decided to join ranks with the youth and demand ‘reform’ of the system (Elsyasi.
corn 2011).
The participation of the iMP would take a different turn after 20 February, when
they called on their supporters to unite with the youth protesters and the masses of
people in their protest activities, which reject the continuation of oppression, despotism,
and corruption’ (Al Jazeera 2011). Instead of ‘reform’, they started to use the Arab
Spring’s term ‘leave’, which called on Arab despots to step down from office.
Still other young people would insist that 11 February is the decisive date of the
Yemeni ‘revolution’. That was the date when Hosni Mubarak announced his resignation.
In their celebrations, some students organized the first sit-in strike in Taiz, the most
populous and fertile part of Yemen: ‘We went first to the Tahrir Square and we were
beaten [by security forcesi and we had to move to Jamal Street and finally we withdraw
to the Freedom Square. It was the first sit-in demonstration in the whole republic’,
Hisham Elribati, the coordinator of the Independent Youth of 11 February Revolution,
explained to me later. Other youth and civil society activists organized demonstrations
in Sana’a on the same day as well, but the main issue here is their affiliation with Taiz,
the location of the largest Sunni governorate.
This youth movement insists on being ‘independent’. They are ‘sick’ of the politics of
political parties and were and still are ‘afraid that it will interfere in the revolution and
direct it towards partisan interests’, as Elribati put it. Interestingly, its position was
translated into one of the most popular slogans of the Yemeni youth revolt: ‘No Par
tisan, no parties. Our revolution is a youth revolution.’ Notwithstanding their slogan, it
is difficult not to notice a leftist ideological streak in their statement.
Finally, yet another youth group would set the date as 16 February. Mohammad Au
Shaen died that day, the first protester to die in the Yemeni uprising. This group, the
16 February Peaceful Youth Revolution, is based in the southern part of Yemen, spe
citically the Aden governorate. Indeed, its main feature is its southern nature. Initially it
was not politically affiliated with the Southern Movement known as al-Hirak, a loose
affiliation of regional opposition organizations and activists in the southern provinces,
which calls for an end to northern hegemony. In fact, Aden has often been a challenge
for the Southern Movement: while it did not support the northern regime, it persis
tently refrained from joining al-Hirak. However, al-L-lirak began to compete with the
Islamist lslah Party, the strongest party in the iMP, to control this youth group. The two
groups agreed on a ban on holding any flags, either the Unified Yemen flag or the
Southern flag, during demonstrations. It was only after members of the old regime
turned against Saleh at the end of March that al-Hirak was in a position to win
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the 16 February youth group over to its side: ‘the revolution, it was said, was hijacked.
It was not a revolution any more. It became part of the old political system’, Sami
Ghaleb, editor-in-chief of the Al Isledaa newspaper, told me. Since then, in its protests
and sit-in strikes, the group has specifically called for ‘southern’ demands.
Obviously, these conflicting dates reflect Yemen’s complicated political landscape.
Yet, regardless of which date sparked the revolt, one thing is clear. By 28 February 2011,
the call for Saleh to step down had turned city squares into melting pots that managed
to unify different groups that otherwise stood at odds to each other.
Same goal, same grievances, revolt expected!
If setting a date for the start of the Yemeni youth revolt is confusing enough, the goal
of the revolt seemed to be clear, at least for the youth groups: ‘Leave!’ This one word
captured the core of their demands. The country’s dire conditions resulted from the
politics of President rAli Abduallah Saleh and he should therefore step down. Young
people I spoke to in Taghier Square in Sana’a on 28 February were sure about this
much. They were convinced that ‘when he steps down, things will be better’ (Manea
201 ic). And what would happen after that? That question seemed to startle them.
The slogans of the Yemeni youth were similar to those of their Tunisian and Egyptian
counterparts. ‘Leave’ was the best known, but various posters called for ‘employmenf,
an end to ‘patronage’, a ‘just state’, ‘accountability’, and an end to the ‘control of
Saleh’s family’.
Their demands were hardly surprising. Just like their Egyptian and Tunisian coun
terparts, young protesters in Yemen were demanding a future and a perspective in their
own country. They wanted a country to call ‘their own’. Of course, one can argue that
the magnitude of poverty and problems in Yemen was not comparable to those in Egypt
and Tunisia. But the roots are similar. With unemployment conservatively estimated at
35 per cent, more than 45 per cent of people living under the poverty line, 30 per cent
of citizens without basic food security, and corruption permeating every level of the
state’s institutions, the revolt was hardly surprising.
Nevertheless, the issues that set the revolt in motion were not only economic in
nature. Just like their Egyptian and Tunisian counterparts. the young Yemenis were
disgusted by a ‘pluralistic system’ that resulted in neither accountability nor real alter
nation of power. All three Arab regimes seemed to follow to the letter the strategy of
controlled liberalization, as defined by Daniel Brumberg (2003: 6, cited by Yom 2005: 23):
‘a method by which governments give “opposition groups a way to blow off steam. The
steam valve must meet opponents’ minimal expectation of political openness ... but
prevent them from undermining the regime’s ultimate control.”
in other words, all three countries had adopted the shell of a democratic legal orga
nizational dimension, which calls for the ‘legal existence of political parties and interest
groups, and their integration into a constitutional legal order’ (Leca 1994: 49). Con
spicuously absent from their systems, however, was what Leca calls the normative
dimension of a democratic system, ‘the core of which is pluralism, where no single
group or party enjoys a monopoly on the political truth. Pluralism thus entails toler
ance, acceptance of majority rule, limited government, and protection of basic rights’(Leca 1994: 49).
The Yemeni political system certainly has similar features of this ‘democratic shell’.
coloured as it may be by a specific local authenticity. Political parties were allowed to
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work freely, and the Yemeni press was providing both critique and platforms for
debates that made their counterparts in the Arabian Peninsula blush with envy. Mean
while, the electoral system, with its bicameral legislature, allowed for some features of
representative democracy, especially as voters have often been keen on exercising their
right to select their lawmakers in every ejection to the House of Representatives.’
This ability to exercise features of a representative democracy was expressed in the
report of the European Union Election Observation Mission (2006) on Yemen’s 2006
presidential and local elections. They portrayed the elections as ‘an openly-contested
electoral process ... that represented a milestone in the democratic development in
Yemen’. Indeed, they said:
The elections benefited from the full engagement of all major political parties and
were notable for the degree of freedom enjoyed by all candidates to assemble and
to express their views so that, for the first time in the political history of both
Yemen and the region, an incumbent faced a real challenge at the polls.
(European (in ion Election Observation Mission 2006: 1)
An active and open electoral process notwithstanding, Yemen’s political and adminis
trative structures had fundamental and systemic weaknesses that undermined the
democratic nature of key aspects of the electoral process. The same European Mission
report was clear about these shortcomings: ‘the results process lacked credibility to the
extent that it was not possible to have confidence in the accuracy of the final results,
State resources were used unfairly by incumbents and women were comprehensively
excluded from the process’ (European Union Election Observation Mission 2006).
Most importantly, the president who competed with others in 2006 had, in fact, held
that office since 1978. Constitutional legitimacy was made a farce through what I term
the uno//icial sphere of politics: ‘a sphere were decisions are made that bypass the law
and the constitution, sometimes with the specific aim of rendering more shallow the
state’s institutional reality’ (Manea 201 la: 87). This phenomenon has allowed Saleh to
change a law with a telephone call. It also allowed him and his closed net of core elites
to change articles in the constitution with an ease that was staggering. This point was
made even clearer by his former ally Sheikh Sadeq Abduallah al-Ahmar, the para
mount sheikh of the Hashid tribal confederation, who stated in a television interview,
‘We have a constitution that we turned into a duck game, every day changing five or
ten of its articles’ (interview with Sadeq al-Ahmar, 1 April 2011).
These fundamental flaws were not lost on young, educated Yemeni men and women.
They had enough of this type of politics. Their revolt, while expected, took the political
establishment and opposition parties and movements by surprise.
Different context!
The similarities between the Yemeni and Tunisian and Egyptian revolts end here.
Indeed, while the roots of the young Yemenis’ grievances were similar to those of their
Tunisian and Egyptian counterparts, the context within which they were operating was
fundamentally different. This is the primary factor that sets Yemen apart from the
other two countries.
In fact, one can argue that Yemen and the other two countries belong to two different
sets of countries, based on the age of their states:
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I Countries of old states and old societies are characterized by a long tradition of a
centralized state apparatus and the existence of a strong national identity. This
group includes Egypt. Tunisia and Morocco. to a lesser extent.
2 Countries of new states and old societies are characterized by the newness of their
states, and by the lack of a solid national identity, and the division of society along
tribal, religious sectarian, linguistic and/or regional lines. Yemen. Syria and Libya
belong to this categor2
The differences in the types of states are, of coursc. reflected in the types of challenges
they face. In the first category, apart from the economic challenges, the issues at
stake are connected with dismantling an authoritarian executive power, and strength
ening the state’s institutions and the separation of powers. In the second category.
the context is volatile and marred by fear of civil war. The challenges therefore are
inherently connected to building state institutions and keeping the state intact anti
unified.
A second line of differentiation between the contexts of Yemen, on the one hand.
and Tunisia and Egypt. on the other, relates to the nature of their core political elites.
For example. compare the composition of the political elites in Yemen and in Egypt.
and the main difference between the two becomes clear: the core elites in Yemen tend
to be members of an ethnic group (sectarian tribal), whereas those in Egypt are more
diversified and less restricted by ethnic considerations. In fact, although Egypt’s political
system is highly centralized and authoritarian, the members of the ruling elite often
come from different social backgrounds, and the criteria by which they arc chosen have
more to do with their party affiliation, education, military background, personal rela
tionships and patron—client relations. This difference has shaped the outcome in the
two countries and helps to explain why it was possible for the Egyptian army leaders to
push Mubarak to leave his position. They were not members of the same clan or the
same family, whose survival depends on his survival. He was simply one person and
he can be replaced.
The third, and most important. line of differentiation that sets Yemen apart from
Tunisia and Egypt is that Yemen can be described as a ‘cunning state’. The features of the
‘cunning state’ have shaped to a great extent the outcome of the Yemeni revolt and the
solutions suggested by the international community. This concept is worth considering
in some detail.
Yemen’s cunning state
The term cunning state’ as used by Shaini Randeria (2003: 4) to refer to states which
capitalize on their perceived weakness in order to render themselves unaccountable
both to their citizens and to international institutions’.
Modifying it to fit the Yemeni context, I define the term as a state run ht ct/ink core
elites, ii’lio exploi the seams of international structures and capitalice on the fear of the
international coiiiniunifl oi’er u.s perceived failure to /)erpetuate its grip on poller.
Yemen’s cunning state is run by ethnic core elites, who play on the ethnic divisions
within their own society: it functions according to a certain pattern of politics and
survives through the fears of its own citizens and the international community. Three
features of the Yemeni cunning state are worth describing, as follows:
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First feature: A state run by ethnic core elites, who exploit the divisions in their
own society
The regime that has controlled Yemen since I 978 is ethnic in nature. It has depended
on the support and loyalty ol a close network within its own sectarian and tribal group,
at the same time playing on the sectarian, tribal and regional divisions within society.
This exploitation of the ethnic divisions within Yemen has led to a constantly shifting
interplay in which various political and ethnic groups are included at the expense of
others at one point, only to be excluded at another point.
More specifically, two circles of power can he identified. The first, the inner circle of
the core elites, includes immediate clan members and the larger tribal groups:
I Immediate clan members. The clan that runs Yemen is the Sanhan tribe, based in
the south--southeast corner of Sana’a, the capital. When Saleh, the former president.
came to power in 1978, he systematically appointed close relatives and members of
his tribe to key command positions, thus ensuring the loyalty of the army and the
security apparatus. His clan’s grip on those two institutions continued after the civil
war of’ 1994, which resolved the power struggle in unified Yemen in his favour.
This grip of the tribe continues today, even after he has stepped down. I will
return to this point later. Suffice it to say at this point that rivalry and competition
have characterized the relationships between Saleh’s immediate clan members. In
other words, relying on the inner circle of the clan is not the same as trusting them.
The power struggle between Saleh and his half-brother Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar, the
commander of the First Armoured Division of the army, is but one example. Since
2000 Ali Mohsen has been seen as an obstacle to a smooth transition of power to
Saleh’s son Ahmed. The struggle turned to open hostility in 2011 when Mohsen
decided to support the youth uprising in 2011 (Manea 2009).
2 The larger sectarian tribal group that Saleh has depended on is the Zaydi Hashid
tribal confederation. It has ensured his survival during critical political upheavals,
including the Sadaa civil war that started in 2004 and the civil war of 1994 when
Hashid tribesmen were a pivotal part of the coalition that ensured Saleh’s victory
against the southern troops.
Again, interdependence between the two groups does not guarantee harmonious rela
tionships. Often their ties feature multiple ups and downs and sometimes bitter rivalry
that can border on open confrontation. One example was the power struggle between
Saleh and the late paramount sheikh of the Hashid confideration, Abduallah al-Ahmar.
This rivalry became open after his death, when his sons supported the youth uprising
in February 20Il.
The second, wider, circle of the power base includes other alliances.
The resilience of the Yemeni political system, and its survival despite continuous crises,
can be attributed to the core elites’ dependence on traditional client-based alliances. At
the core of this strategy is a Machiavellian strategy of divide and rule, which constantly
adjusts and changes its alliances as the sands of Yemeni politics shift.
Yemen’s core elites often make their alliances with members of social groups within
the wider circle of their traditional base of power. This circle includes ‘those religious,
sectarian, tribal, or regional groups which are marginalized, discriminated against, or
tel threatened within the larger system, or simply aspire to be part of’ the political
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svsteiii and gain some 0! its spoiis ( Manea 201 Ia: 122). ‘Ihis uncle has pro\ed itaI !oithe elites’ polities of survival: it has often played on the sense of ictinuzition. Ieai orambition iiifloih! these social groups. and then plived them agunst other eoinpetuigpolitical powers or against each other. 1 his strategy has one clear purpose: to weakeneompetins political groups that prove threateunig to their authority.Soinetinies alliances include tribal eonf derations. such as the Bakil, known lustori—ealR to be at odds with the 1—lashid eonflderation. ( )ther times they include members
and groups of the Sunni middle region (a/—i1uiIu/Os/ a! ioiala). who hake often resentedthe Zaydi tribe’s control of pow er. At one point the Saleh regime engaged w ith theLavdi 1—I uthi movement which later launched a rebellion against Saleh in the iiortheriicit\ of Sadaa. Salch showered the movement with money and privileges and encouraged it to propagate its own line of ftnth thiough preaching and schools At the time.Saleh was trying to counter the growing influence of his fbrmer ally, the Sunni IslamistIslah Party.
Most significantly, alliances within the wider circle of power have included dissatisfiedsouthern groups. Among them are army commanders and political figures. m:unlv I rumthe southern regions of Abien and Shabwa. who were defeated in the I 080 southerncivil war and later lied to the north and were allowed to leorgailize their defeated arm\brigades in what was later called the Brigades of I inity. These brigades were instrumentalin supporting Saleh in the I 904 civil war. The new President Abed Rabbo MansouiI ladi. who caine to pover in 1-ebruary 2012 as part of the Gull lnitmatie pro smons.and his defence minister belong to this group.
\Vliil’ this complicated web of alliances and ties nia seem confusing, one key poutshould be emphasized here: the survival and resilience of Yemen’s eunnnig slate can beattributed to its e\ploitation ol the divisions within its own soeuet\. In other words.Yemeni social divisions along tribal, regional and sectarian lines have. in tact, beenaccentuated and strengthened b\ the ‘cmeni leadership itself.
Second feature: A state that is constantly engaged in the politics of survival
Survial has been the main concern of the ‘remenm ethnic core elites. The woid ‘sur\ i alhere means the iced of the ruling elites to undertake wliates er is necessary to keep theirhold on power and to survive in the mo nig sands of Yemeni politics. I use tIle term hereto indicate core elites’ ‘shiftnig alliances with ariouis political and social groups andtheir allocation and channeling of resources to these gioups to ensure their hold onpower and to sur\ ive in a hostile political en ironineilt’ (Manea 201 Ia: 11)8). 1 heYemeni core elites juggle a collection of diflerent and sometimes competing interests.and simultaneously direct these strategies to the tiltunate aim of this politics: staving inpowei. It should be emphasized here that this fleatuie is not unique to Yemen: it isci) nm in on a in on p A ia b a u t Ii o rita ii a ii iegi in es.
In addition to the regime’s shifting alliances, it uses two other strategies fbi survm iiI:
I It takes ad\ antage of the phenomenon of political Islam. Here the core elites endorsecertain lslamtst groups rather than others and fbige political alliances with them.The main aim of this strategy is political: to deplo\ the support of these groups as a
meamis of legitimizing the regime’s rule in a religious sense, and/or to delegitimize its
rivals. ilie tactic has also been nistrumnental in undernuning rival Islanust groupsthat pose an\ real challenge to the state’s leidei’sIup. and iii side—lining oi even
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gaining the reluctant support ot other political groups that fear the rise of political
Islam in their societies (Manea 2011 a: 109).
2 Corruption. Salah’s regime encouraged corruption as a means of controlling those
included within the system. According to Sarah Phillips (2011: 61), ‘Salch was explicit
in his distrust of people who “did not steal”; and he ‘kept relatively reliable records of
the corrupt activities of influential elites’, which were used as ‘a way of “putting a knee
into the backs” of those who were disloyal to him through the threat of prosecution.’
Clearly. then, the politics of survival have meant that the state’s resources were often
not directed towards the country’s development and its population’s well-being. It has
also meant that mismanagement and waste of those resources were a natural outcome.
Third feature: A state that is constantly engaged in the politics of blackmail
By the politics of blackmail I refer to the Yemeni cunning state’s constant exploitation
of its perceived imminent failure or collapse to avoid real reform of the system and to
continue the core elites’ grip on power. It has entailed a constant engagement in what
Phillips correctly described as the politics of permanent crisis and it has two dimensions,
local and international.
The local dimension entails a ‘promise of relative stability within a heavily armed
society and of being the provider of “safe” and gradual processes of political and social
change’ (Phillips 2011: 56). State collapse has often been used as a threatening monster
that will be unleashed from its cage if, and only if, the regime of the cunning state ends.
Saleh’s speech after winning the 2006 presidential elections illuminates this strategy:
The People of Yemen said ‘yes’ to security and stability ... Which is better, Saddam
Hussein’s dictatorship or today’s democracy in Iraq where massacres happen every
day? ... which is better, the dictatorship of Mohammed [Siyaad] Barre or the
situation in Somalia now’?
(Quoted in P1iil1ins 2(111: 56)
The international dimensions entail exerting pressure on the seams of regional and
nternational structures. The Yemeni foreign policy realm was and still is the area
where the Yemeni leadership has been able to manoeuvre and strengthen its position
vis-à-vis regional and international actors, During the Cold War, the leadership of North
Yemen used this method by exploiting the superpower rivalry: every time it felt humi
liated or mistreated by Saudi Arabia or the US it turned to the Soviet Union! It has also
used it since Yemen’s unification in 1990 and after the civil war in 1994. The method is
hardly new. Many developing states have chosen this strategy to counter their weakness
within the international community (Manea 2005: 118—123). However, a particular fea
ture of the Yemeni cunning state’s foreign policy is its growing ability to hold hostage
its regional and international allies, It has used two tools in this strategy: the international
var on terrorism and the international fear of the state’s imminent collapse.
The first tool relates to the role Yemen has played since 2001 in the US war against
terrorism. Isa Blumi (2011: 143) correctly asserts in his book Chaos in Yemen that in the
context of the ‘global war on terror, Yemen’s status as a “frontline” state has given the regime
a strategic option that simply expands instability in order to reiterate the fundamental
value of the regime to this larger concern of the United States and its allies’.
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Conclusion: Outsmarting the cunning state?
7
In fact, the regime has often deliberately expanded instability
— and I am not alone
in holding this opinion. Experience has taught Saleh and his regime that ‘foreign gov
ernments will offer more money with fewer strings attached if the threat posed by
Yemeni militancy is credible’ (Phillips 2011: 139). Naturally, the ‘credibility’ of the
threat has often been produced by Saleh’s regime itself Examples are plentiful: they start
with pardoning known terrorists, releasing al-Qaeda suspects from prison, and allowing
Islamist militants to ‘escape’ from prison, and extend to utilizing ‘islamist threats’ in
the southern regions.
The second tool relates to the fear of regional and international actors that the
Yemeni state will collapse at any moment. This fear is understandable given Yemen’s
close proximity to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf States and its control over Bab al-Mandab,
where an estimated 3.3 million barrels of oil pass by every day. Chaos in Yemen would
also provide a safe haven in the Arabian Peninsula for al-Qacda, which already has a
presence in Yemen and is intent on destabilizing the Gulf regimes.
The potential failure of the Yemeni state is not exaggerated. In 2011 the country was
ranked 13th among countries most at risk of failure (Failed State index). In fact, apply
ing the Failed State indicators reveals that the state is, indeed, failing its citizens: it is
incapable of delivering public goods and unable to exercise control over the legitimate
usc of force in its own territory.
interestingly, though, Yemen’s core elites were not alarmed by their country’s rating
on the index. It simply states what has always been obvious to them. What they have
done, though, was masterfully manipulate this sense of alarm among Western govern
ments to get more financial aid and military assistance. They used that aid for their
politics of survival and rarely employed it to tackle the social grievances of their
population or to combat terrorism.4This strategy of blackmail proved very useful when
the youth revolts broke out in February 2011
It was within this context of Yemen’s cunning state that the youth revolt took place.
The politics of the cunning state have produced three zones of conflict, operating
behind the backdrop of the youth uprising:
A power struggle between two factions of the core elites. The first faction consists of
President Saleh and his son and nephews. The other represents the wing of Saleh’s
half-brother Au Mohsen al-Ahmar, together with Sadeq and Hamid al-Ahmar, the
sheikhs of the Hashid tribal confederation. This wing was supported by the Islamist
lslah party, which is headed by Sheikh Hamid aI-Ahmar.
A regional Southern movement rallying against Northern hegemony. This move
ment started in 2006 because of social grievances connected to the 1994 civil war
between North and South Yemen. It is not homogenous and is divided between two
main factions; the first calls for total separation between North and South, and the
other seeks a federal system, which would allow autonomous status for South
Yemen.
3 A Huthi rebellion in the northern region of Sadaa. This rebellion, which has led to
several wars and the displacement of more than 200,000 persons since 2004, was an
expression of a combination of social and economic grievances, It was also a reaction
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to the rise and encroachments of Sunni Islamist Salah religious teaching. supported
vet again by the cunning Saleh state.
The youth uprising became a stage upon which all these conflicts could play out. The
Huthi and Southern movements joined the youths in their sit-in strikes and the calls on
Saleh to step down. In this uprising both movements saw a chance to air their own
regional grievances.
But, in fact. it was the support of the second wing of the cunning state’s core elites
that ultimately changed the nature of the youth uprising. That change came daysafter
the 18 \‘larch 2011 massacre by snipers of more than 52 peaceful protesters in Taghier
Square in Sana’a.
Gradually the rules of the ‘revolt’ started to be dictated by this wing, allied with the
Islamist lslah party of the iMP. One by one, control over the squares fell into the hands
of the lslah party’s militia and supporters. Those who protested were beaten or
defamed, or chose to move to a different square. Women who defied social norms and
participated in the uprising were reminded that traditional structural inequalities still
persist.5 Not surprisingly, both the Huthi and Southern movements felt alienated by
this development and left the squares.
As the nature of the uprising changed. so did its objectives and the solutions that
were suggested. The aim was not a change of the regime. It became restricted to purging
the Saleh foction from the regime. But the regime itself, and its cunning nature, were
never placed in question.
In ftict, the Gulf Initiative, issued by the Gulf’ Cooperation Council on 21 and 22 May
2011, clearly avoided shaking the Yemeni boat. It made it possible for Saleh to step
down. But it left the power structures intact and recycled the core elites. This is evident
in the provision that led to the creation of a ‘national consensus government’, divided
on a 50:50 basis between the government (Saleh’s fttction) and the opposition (al-Ahmar’s
faction).6
Real reforms were avoided l’or many reasons, Chief among them was the international
community s fear that such reforms would lead to the ‘state’s collapse’!
Fear of ‘rocking the boat’ has been also evident in the manner by which the national
dialogue has been so for conducted. The national dialogue conference — a corner stone
of the Gulf Initiative — started on June 2013 and concluded on January 2014. Its purpose
has been to address and resolve in an inclusive manner core Yemeni conflicts (among
others: Southern issue, Saada issue, national reconciliation and transitional justice, the
torm of the new state, good governance, role of the army and security apparatus. etc.)
(Technical Committee f’or the Preparation of the National Dialogue Conference
December 2012: 12—13),
The Gulf Initiative did create a framework for peace through the NDC. The conference
provided a political participation platform for groups including women, youth and new
political parties, which were often excluded from the informal elite power-sharing agree
ment. This was imperative given the alienation many youth and civil activists experi
enced because of the lack of transparency and elitist manner through which the Gulf
Initiative was reached (Hill et al 2013: 14; Manea 2OIlb). The importance of a sense of
empowerment among these groups should not be underestimated. Yet the limits of
what the N DC could achieve were clear to many. Put simply, the problem remains that
what has been done and discussed within the halls of the conference was removed from
a reality dominated by cunning state logic and a shaky power equation between old rivals.
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Arwa Othrnan. the head of the Rights and Freedom Committee within the conference,
explains it in clear terms:
The same powers (tribal/religious/military) are taking part in the dialogue; you find
them sitting together on the same table and discuss with smiles and blessings. But
outside (the conference) their hands are on their guns’ trigger. And that is why. every
time we come with serious decisions, and the decisive hour (of implementation)
approaches, obstruction starts, and the smiles turn into a waving (threatening) with
the streets stick.
(Arwa Othman, pers mm 23 October 2013)
This context reflected on the transitional justice process that took place during the last
months. Abdul Karim al-Khaiwani, a member of the transitional justice team in theNDC who has conducted research on human rights violations and was himself imprisoned
and tortured, captured the essence of this process:
The basics of a transitional justice process require a transitional situation and that
those who committed human rights violations step down from their positions ofpower. Both are absent in Yemen. We do not have a transitional situation and the
perpetrators are still holding positions of authority and the parties that committed
violations are in power.
(Interi’ieii’ nit/i the author, Sana’a, 12 IVoi’embei 2013)
The logic of the cunning state seems to have won the upper hand and the youth wereleft with a bitter sense of betrayal. Pushing Saleh to ‘leave’ was easy, as it turned out.But outsmarting the cunning state was not only difficult, It was impossible.
Notes
I The bicameral electoral system consists of two parts: (a) 301 members of the House of Reprc
sentatives (Ma//is Annoiiab). elected by plurality vote in single-member constituencies to serve
six-year terms: and (b) the ill members of the Shura Council (Mu//is Alshoora). who are appointedby the president. For an account of how Yemeni voters exercised their rights in the 2003 elections.
see Carapico (2003).
2 On the formation of Arab states, see Anderson (1987).
3 This discussion of the Yemeni power structure is adapted from Manea (2Olla: 95101).4 For more on how the language of failed states obscures the way Hi which reginle incentives
to build state institutions can be incompatible with regime incentives to survive’, see Wedeen(2010: 2).
5 Arwar Othman. a pioneer activist who objected to the Islamists segregating males and females
on 16 April 2011, is one famous example. Because she insisted on participating on an equalfooting without discrimination based on her gender, she and 18 of her male and female colleagues were beaten. The attack has drawn sharp criticism and condemnation from many political
and civil actors in Yemen.
6 For a critique of the Gulf Initiative, see Manea (201 Ib).
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al-Khaiwani, Abdul Karim, interview with the author, Sana’a, November 2013.
al-Ahmar. Sadeq. interview on Suhail Satellite television. I April 2011. <http://www.voutube.com/
watch?vp7roB6Pr8Nw>. accessed 26 July 2012.
Elribati, Hisham. telephone interview with author. Taiz. 27 June 2012.
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Mansour. Mohammad, coordinator of the 16 February Peaceful \outh Revolution, telephone
interview with author, ,\den. 2 July 2012.
Shakir, \Vameedh, interview with author. Sana’a, 28 February 2011.
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